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Introduction
How far has international law come, in what our forebears, back in
1649, called "the great business" of denying impunity to tyrants accused of
mass murdering their own people?
Slobodan Milogevit sits in a dock in The Hague; he has been strutting
and fretting his time on this televised stage since his trial began-as long
ago as February 2002. The prosecution case took three years to finish. It
will be several more years before the judgment is entered, and more years
still before the appeal process will be completed. In the meantime, his pop-
ularity in Serbia soars, his party almost won the last election, his approval
rating is much higher than when the trial began. He dominates the court,
which sits only two days a week to accommodate his illness and allow his
right to self-defence. He manifests contempt for the judges, and he insults
the witnesses and victims. The presiding judge has died-from causes
doubtless exacerbated by exasperation. The Prime Minister of Serbia, who
courageously surrendered him, has been assassinated. Milogevit has man-
aged to turn his dock into a soap box, from which he declaims remorse-
lessly and without remorse.
The next head of state to stand at the bar will be Saddam Hussein.
Because America, effectively the sponsor of his trial, does not like what it
t Queens Counsel; U.N. Appeal Judge, Special Court for Sierra Leone; Head,
Doughty Street Chambers; Master of the Middle Temple and Visiting Professor,
University of London (Queen Mary College). Author, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANiTY, THE
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (New Press 2000).
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sees of the Milogevit trial, he will be denied the right of self-defence.
Although he has been charged with international crimes, he will not be
appearing before international judges. He will be tried by Iraqi judges who
have no experience of trials of this kind. Several have themselves been
jailed by Saddam, so questions of bias will arise. They will try him not in
the safety of The Hague, but in the lethal environment of Baghdad, where
one of them has already been assassinated. Many of these judges took their
judicial oaths under the old Iraqi Constitution, which provided the Presi-
dent-Saddam Hussein-with absolute immunity from any prosecution for
crimes committed while in office, so on that technicality they will be asked
to acquit him.
But if, as a result of these trials, both men are convicted of mass mur-
der-what then? For Milogevit, the comparative comfort of a Scandinavian
cell with extensive visiting rights, free telephone, internet and 140 televi-
sion channels, many showing pornography. From there, he could still play
an important role in Serbian politics. For Saddam, most likely a public
hanging in some dusty square where his statue once stood. He will die a
martyr's death on the gallows. What greater incitement for his supporters
to step up the ferocious civil war?
I raise these problems at the outset, not because I despair of the trial
and punishment of tyrants, but because I firmly believe in ending their
impunity. It has been a very long and difficult struggle-legal, political and
diplomatic-to hold political and military leaders accountable for crimes
against humanity. It was only very recently that the legal problem of sover-
eign immunity was solved, so it is hardly surprising that we have not yet
found the right procedures for delivering international criminal justice
fairly, expeditiously and effectively. In order better to appreciate the scale
and the novelty of these problems, let me introduce the trials of Milogevit
and Hussein by telling the story of the struggle against impunity in history
and in international law. We can date the difficulties of bringing a head of
state to trial from the time when modern international law began, in Octo-
ber 1648, with the Treaty of Westphalia, ending thirty years of war on the
European continent.
I. Sovereign Immunity: Before Nuremberg
The Treaty of Westphalia was based on the sovereignty of states and
the sovereign immunity of heads of state-kings and princes who could do
no wrong-and the inviolability of their ambassadors and diplomats.
Immunities of this kind, stemming from heraldic principles, had existed
from time immemorial, but the Treaty set in legal stone the immunity of the
sovereign and his representatives, whether from liability to their own peo-
ple or to prosecution by other states or alliances of states. It embodied the
philosophy of Machiavelli and of Jean Bodin: the prince was untouchable,
above the law.
The best thing about the Treaty of Westphalia was that England was
not a party to it. By England, I include America-the Puritan colonies of
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New England, which play an important part in this story.' The Puritans,
some 30,000 of them, had left Britain in the 1630s in search of John Win-
throp's Bible Commonwealth, his "city on a hill."' 2 They had been perse-
cuted by the Star Chamber; their worship had been banned by Anglican
bishops, and their parliament had been closed down by Charles 1. Many of
them-including most of Harvard's first graduates-returned from America
in the 1640s to fight the civil war on Cromwell's side. It was a war begun
by King Charles I, in 1642, in support of his claim to absolute rule: his
right to dismiss judges at his pleasure; to imprison political opponents; his
right to tax and govern without Parliament. He commanded troops who
under his direction committed war crimes by plundering towns, killing
civilians and torturing prisoners of war. Charles was captured but he
refused Parliament's offer to share power; from his captivity, he fomented a
second war. He lost that one as well and one in ten adult Englishmen had
lost their lives by the time he began planning a third. That was when the
Puritans decided to put him on trial. Their leaders included Hugh Peters, a
founder of Harvard, and Sir Henry Vane, a former governor of Massachu-
setts. The first use of the word "impunity" in its modern sense is found in
the statute that set up the court for this first trial of a head of state. This
special High Court of Justice, said our Parliament-yours and mine, all
those years ago-was established, "[tjo the end that no chief officer or mag-
istrate may hereafter presume traitorously or maliciously to injure or imag-
ine or continue the enslaving or destroying of the English nation, and
expect impunity for so doing.' 3
There are some extraordinary parallels between the trial of Charles I
and the trials of Milogevit and Saddam. Saddam, when he first appeared
before a judge in 2004, used language in English translation that was
almost identical to that used by Charles I: "By what authority-legal, I
mean-do you sit as a court to judge me?"'4 Charles I relied upon the rule
that the King, as the source of law, is necessarily above it-sovereign immu-
nity in the true sense-and upon the rule in the Magna Carta that guaran-
teed trial by peers-as the King, he could have no peers. But Parliament
and the army set up the court with a presiding judge and about seventy
jurors drawn from the most influential sections of society. The prosecutor,
John Cooke, drew upon Magna Carta, the law of nations, and of the Bible
to charge him with a crime that only kings or other heads of state could
commit: a crime called tyranny, committed by a ruler who mass murders
his own people and denies them civil and religious liberties. Charles had
abolished Parliament and denied his people "democracy," although in
those days democracy was only for men and only if they were in possession
of property.
1. It is told in full in GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE TYRANNICIDE BRIEF (2005).
2. See FRAN'cis J. BREMER, JOHN WINTHROP: AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN FOUNDING FATHER
(2003).
3. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 12.
4. Id. at 6.
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Cooke had plenty of compelling evidence: intercepted correspon-
dence, witnesses who had seen the King directing torture of prisoners and
so on. The King had access to the best lawyers in the land-Matthew Hale,
still venerated today, was ready to defend him. But Charles refused to
plead, and with a courage and nobility that he had never shown in his life,
he attacked the lawfulness of the court and all its proceedings. He showed
utter contempt for the judges, abused them, and eloquently refused to
recognise their jurisdiction over him. The court had to apply the contem-
porary rule that a refusal to plead was in law a confession of guilt: they had
no alternative but to convict him of tyranny and treason and sentence him
to death. He went bravely to the scaffold, playing the martyr's part to
perfection. As Andrew Marvell put it:
"He nothing common did or mean
Upon that memorable scene."'5
His followers in England came to regard him as a saint. Eleven years
later, after Cromwell's death, his son Charles 11 was restored as an absolute
monarch. In 1660, the King's judges were themselves put on trial at the
Old Bailey. The prosecution alleged that fanatical American religious ter-
rorists-the Puritan preachers in Massachusetts-had plotted the King's
death and sent Peters and Vane across the Atlantic to conspire with Crom-
well. The judges, along with the prosecutor Cooke and the "Americans,"
Peters and Vane, were sentenced to death by hanging, drawing, and quar-
tering. In public at Charing Cross, their privates were cut off and thrown
to the dogs, they were disembowelled and their intestines were burnt in
front of their goggling eyes before they died.
The trial of Charles I was compulsory reading for the French revolut-
ionaries when they put Louis XVI on trial in 1792. Louis had very good
lawyers who studied David Hume's accounts of the trial of the British Head
of State and advised him to adopt the same tactic of denying jurisdiction,
since the French constitution guaranteed his inviolability, but the King
doggedly insisted upon trying to establish his innocence. 6 That was a big
mistake. Louis was unanimously convicted by Parliament-a National
Assembly that had already declared him guilty (so much for the fairness of
trial by politicians). The vote to have him executed, however, was close.
Tom Paine was an honorary delegate (a tribute to his role in the American
Revolution) and urged that the King should instead be exiled to America,
where he might be reformed and become a democrat. Marat jumped up to
accuse Paine of being a Quaker and opposed to the death penalty on prin-
ciple, while Robespierre shouted that humanity could not pardon mass
murdering despots and St. Just adopted John Cooke's argument that all
kings were tyrants and this King must die so that the monarchy would die
with him. Jacobin censorship ensured that Louis did not become a martyr:
they even directed drummers to interrupt his speech from the guillotine.
5. Andrew Marvell, An Horation Ode Upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland, in
ANDREW MARVELL: SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE 57, 58 (Robert Wilcher ed., 1986).
6. SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 659 (1989).
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When the British defeated Napoleon, they knew better than to put him
on trial. He was exiled to St. Helena, a small island in the South Atlantic
from which escape is still impossible, visiting rights are limited since a ship
visits only once a month and there is no television.
International law in the nineteenth century defined two international
law crimes capable of commission by individuals-piracy and slave trad-
ing-and there was a customary right to punish enemy soldiers who vio-
lated the laws of war, but heads of state were impervious to this dawning
universal jurisdiction. Sovereign immunity was perceived as a diplomatic
necessity; leaders would be less willing to surrender or settle if there was
any likelihood that they would be put on trial and executed. This doctrine
was, of course, congenial to rulers. It appears to have first been compre-
hensively challenged by the British Attorney General, F. E. Smith, who
became convinced of the moral imperative of trying Kaiser Wilhelm II for
war crimes-notably for his approval of the unprovoked invasion of
Belgium and the use of unrestricted submarine warfare. Smith's argument
was that diplomatic expediency must give way to justice-it was morally
wrong to punish sailors for sinking passenger ships if those who gave the
orders were immune-and to deterrence-"you strike at the whole corps if
you strike at the head." 7
At a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Smith's eloquent plea for
command responsibility was accepted," but the U.S. delegation at Ver-
sailles regarded the principle of sovereign immunity as immutable. Secre-
tary of State Lansing argued that international crimes were nonjusticiable;
"[t]here is no fixed and universal standard of humanity" and hence no
hope of an objective and unbiased judge.9 As a concession to the concerns
of Britain and the Commonwealth, Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty pro-
vided for the establishment of an international special tribunal, comprised
of judges from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to
put Wilhelm II on trial. 10 In the meantime, however, the ex-Kaiser had
been granted refuge by the Dutch government, which permitted him to live
happily ever after in Holland until his death in 1941.
7. F.E. Smith's advice to cabinet on the need to prosecute the ex-Kaiser is set out in
GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS,
69-73 (2000).
8. A commission appointed by the Allies to examine the responsibility of the
"authors of the war" rejected the sovereign immunity of high officials and urged that
"[a]ll persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been,
without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences
against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to prosecution."
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 98,
117.
9. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAWS OF WAR 37 (His Majesty's Stationery Office 1948); see also LYAL S. SUNGA,
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
43 (1992).
10. Treaty of the Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany art.
227, June 28, 1919, 225 CONSOL. T.S. 188, 285, reproduced in 13 AM.J. INT'L. L. No. 3.
Supp.: Official Documents, 151 (July 1919).
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II. Nuremberg
Head of state immunity was not permitted to prevail in the Nuremberg
Charter, the outcome of the Four Power Agreement signed in London on
August 8, 1945. It provided for "an International Military Tribunal for the
trial of war criminals whose offences have no particular geographical loca-
tion."1 1 Article 7 of the Charter expressly rejected sovereign immunity for
military and political leaders: "The official position of defendants, whether
as heads of state or responsible officials in government departments, shall
not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment."'12
Article 7, and indeed the Nuremburg Charter itself, only came to pass
as the result of an excruciating behind-the-scenes debate between the Allies
as to the fate of the Nazi leaders. This time, national positions were
reversed. Churchill repudiated F. E. Smith's views and demanded sum-
mary execution for "world outlaws" like Hitler, Himmler and fifty of their
henchmen: his real fear was that if put in the witness box they would use it
as a soap box to propagate their policies or as a place of privilege from
which to make accusations against the Allies. To this pragmatic objection
by the British, President Truman and his chief adviser, Supreme Court Jus-
tice Robert Jackson, took a celebrated stand on principle, which was subse-
quently supported by the Soviet Union and France:
[Uindiscriminating executions or punishments without definite findings of
guilt, fairly arrived at... would not sit easily on the American conscience or
be remembered by our children with pride. The only other course is to
determine the innocence or guilt of the accused after a hearing as dispas-
sionate as the times and horrors we deal with will permit, and upon a record
that will leave our reasons and motives clear. 13
As the Nuremberg tribunal pointed out, its Charter was "the expres-
sion of International Law existing at the time of its creation; and to that
extent is itself a contribution to International Law." 14 Jackson, the prose-
cutor, opened his case with a proclamation that the privileges attaching in
international law to the State should never again shield human beings from
retribution for their own wickedness, at least before an international court:
These defendants were men of a station and rank which does not soil its
own hands with blood. They were men who knew how to use lesser folk as
tools. We want to reach the planners and designers, the inciters and leaders
.... The idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a
11. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 282, reprinted in
39 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 257, 258 (1945).
12. Nuremberg Charter art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
288.
13. ROBERT JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 8 (Knopf 1971); See also ANNE & JOHN
TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 66 (1983). Jackson's report to Truman is dated June 1,
1945.
14. 22 TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING IN NUREMBERG GERMANY 444 (1946) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS].
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fiction. Crimes are always committed only by persons ... [ilt is quite intol-
erable to let such a legalism become the basis of personal immunity ....
Modern civilisation puts unlimited weapons of destruction in the hands of
men. It cannot tolerate so vast an area of legal irresponsibility. 15
It was the judgment at Nuremberg which heralded the removal of the
shield of state sovereignty for crimes against humanity:
It was submitted that ... where the act in question is an act of state, those
who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the state. In the opinion of the tribunal (this
contention) must be rejected .... Crimes against international law are com-
mitted by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced
... . [T]he principle of international law, which under certain circum-
stances protects the representative of the state, cannot be applied to acts
which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these
acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be
freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.
16
The Nuremberg trial actually set a precedent for putting on trial a for-
mer head of state because one defendant, Admiral Karl Doenitz, had occu-
pied that position for a brief period between the Fuhrer's suicide and the
German surrender. Article 7 was replicated in the law under which the
Allies prosecuted war crimes after Nuremberg 17 and in the Charter for the
Tokyo trials of Japanese war criminals, 18 although there it was watered
down to disguise the uncomfortable fact that General MacArthur had, for
political reasons, decided to give practical immunity to the Japanese Head
of State. Emperor Hirohito is now regarded by historians as bearing ulti-
mate responsibility for approving Japanese aggression: that his omission
from the indictment went without serious protest (other than by the Austra-
lian and French judges) is an indication of the contemporary uncertainty
over a head of state's immunity to prosecution. 19
Shortly after the judgment at Nuremberg, however, the United Nations
General Assembly formally adopted a resolution "affirmjing] the princi-
ples of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribu-
15. 7 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, OPENING SPEECHES OF THE CHIEF PROSECUTORS
42 (1946).
16. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 446-47.
17. See Allied Control Council Law Number 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity art. 4a,, December 20, 1945,
3 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 49 (1946), reprinted in BENJA-
MIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488
(1980).
18. See TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS, DEP'T OF STATE PUBLICATION 2613, FAR
EASTERN SERIES 12, 39-44 (1946).
19. The presiding Australian judge, Sir William Webb, actually argued that because
"the leader of the crime, though available for trial, had been granted immunity," his
accomplices should have their death sentences commuted. On the politics behind the
provision of effective immunity to the Emperor, see generally JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRAC-
ING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR 11 (1999).
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nal and the judgment of the Tribunal. '20 As Lord Browne-Wilkinson
explains in Pinochet No. III, "At least from that date onwards the concept of
personal liability for a crime in international law must have been part of
international law."'2 1
On December 9, 1948 the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Geno-
cide Convention, which envisaged an "international penal tribunal" to try
this worst of all crimes and included a provision that convicts "shall be
punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public offi-
cials or private individuals."2 2 The very next day-December 10, 1948-it
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a pledge to protect
human rights through the rule of law without exception or immunity for
any "state, group or person. '"23
In 1950, the International Law Commission adopted the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg tribunal. It
defined Nuremberg Principle 3 as follows: "The fact that a person who
committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted
as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him
from responsibility under international law."'2 4
111. After Nuremberg
It was doubtless due to Cold War realpolitik that no head of state was
held responsible in international law thereafter, until the indictment of
Jean Kambanda, Prime Minster of Rwanda during the genocide months of
1994.25 But the influential lectures on the legal position of heads of state,
delivered at the Hague Academy in that year by Sir Arthur Watts confi-
dently stated, "the idea that individuals who commit international crimes
are internationally accountable for them has now become an accepted part
of international law."'2 6 In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established, followed the next year by
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR). Their statutes pro-
vided that "[tihe official position of any accused person, whether as Head
of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
20. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1
(1946).
21. R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1
A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) [hereinafter Pinochet III], available at http://www.publica-
tions.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990324/pinol .htm.
22. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
arts. IV, VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
23. G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 30, U.N. GOAR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
24. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/
1316 (1950), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 364, 375.
25. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-DP, Indictment (Oct.19,
1997). He pled guilty.
26. Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads
of Governments and Foreign Ministers, 3 RECUEIL DES CouRS 82 (1994) (emphasis in the
original).
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relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."2 7
Slobodan Milogevit was indicted whilst he was incumbent President of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and charged in relation to acts allegedly
committed whilst he served as head of state. The ICTY Trial Chamber has
rejected his claim to be immune from prosecution and in doing so has
observed that the rule set out above in Article 7(2) of its Statute, "at this
time reflects a rule of customary international law."'2 8
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) solidified
the principle that there can be no head of state immunity in an interna-
tional criminal court; it entered into force on July 1, 2002, and Article 27
comprehensively provides:
[O]fficial capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Govern-
ment or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute
.... Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 29
IV. The ICJ Decision in D.R.C. v. Belgium
The ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC are courts vested with international
penal jurisdiction. Can that jurisdiction be exercised by hybrid courts,
like that in Sierra Leone, or by national bodies like the Iraqi Special Tribu-
nal? The answer lies embedded in the recent International Court of Justice
(ICJ) case of D.R.C. v. Belgium.30 In this case, the court considered the
scope of the immunity of a minister for foreign affairs-by necessary impli-
cation, the immunity of heads of state and government leaders-in the con-
text of an arrest warrant which had been issued against an incumbent by a
foreign national court. Two facts were crucial to the ICJ decision that this
warrant was unlawful: the fact that the minister was in office at the time
and the fact that the court in question was a national court, exercising a
jurisdiction bestowed by national legislation. The majority opinion-that
such leaders are, while serving, absolutely immune from any exercises of
27. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art.
7(2), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1194, available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/
statut/statute.htm; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(2),
Nov. 8, 1994, 33 l.L.M. 1598, 1604, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basic
docs/statute.html.
28. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions,
'128 (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milutinovic/trialc/decision-e/
1110873516829.htm; see also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial
Judgment, 140 (Dec. 10, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/tri-
alc2/judgement/fur-tj981210e.pdf (indicating that Article 7(2) of the ICTY statute is
"indisputably declaratory of customary international law").
29. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
30. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.), 2002
l.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter DRC]. Decisions of the International Court of Justice
are binding only between the parties; nonetheless they are entitled to great respect inso-
far as they elucidate rules of international law.
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criminal jurisdiction by national courts, whether or not the crime charged
is also a crime under international law and whether or not the offending
action was taken in an official or private capacity-does not apply to bar
their prosecution:
i. by national courts in their own country for acts committed at any time,
ii. in a foreign national court if the state waives immunity,
iii. in a foreign national court after they cease to hold office, for acts commit-
ted before or after tenure or even during that tenure if such acts were com-
mitted in a private capacity,
iv. in an international criminal court, for acts committed at any time.
3 1
Courts in the first three categories are easy to identify, but the fourth
category requires closer examination. The ICJ decision was joined by thir-
teen judges, but eight of these appended separate concurring opinions and
three others dissented. The most important of the separate concurring
opinions, which deals with jurisprudential issues which the majority opin-
ion did not cover, was rendered jointly by Judges Higgins, Koojimans and
Buergenthal, 32 and indicates a more restricted view of sovereign immunity.
This view finds an echo not only in the three dissents but in at least two of
the separate individual opinions (by Judges Koroma and Ranjeva). Consid-
erable persuasive weight can therefore be given to the three-judge concur-
ring opinion.
The case arose from the action of an investigating judge for a first-
instance court in Belgium, who received a dozen complaints-several from
Belgian nationals-that the Foreign Minister of the Congo, Adboulaye Yer-
odia Ndombasi, had made speeches in the Congo which had incited racial
hatred and led to mass killings. Having investigated, the judge issued and
transmitted to INTERPOL an "international arrest warrant in absentia"
charging Yerodia with crimes against humanity, under a universal jurisdic-
tion given to the court by Belgian law to punish war crimes "wheresoever
they may be committed."'33
This jurisdiction had been used effectively and unexceptionally to con-
vict Hutu nuns who had subsequently settled in Belgium for their part in
the Rwandan genocide. 34 But other than shared nationality with a few
complainants and perhaps historical guilt over King Leopold,3 5 Belgium
had no connection with the alleged crimes, the alleged criminal (who had
never visited Belgium) or his alleged victims. The "investigating judge,"
equivalent in function to an American prosecutor, did not have to satisfy a
Belgian court as to the credibility of his evidence. The "hate speech"
31. Id. 61.
32. Id. (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal).
33. Id., c 13, 15.
34. See L'Accusation c. Ntezimana, Higaniro, Mukangango, Mukabutera, (Cour
d'Assises de Bruxelles, June 8, 2001), available at http://www.asf.be/AssisesRwanda2/
fr/frVERDICTverdict.htm.
35. See generally ADAm HocHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST (1999) (describing the
role of King Leopold in the exploration, exploitation, and colonization of the African
continent).
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charge was in any event controversial and difficult to link causally with
subsequent killings. The facts were not, in other words, a good test for the
important argument that universal jurisdiction can be bestowed on
national courts for prosecution of crimes against humanity in cases where
the international community turns its back. Prior to the judgment, Mr.
Yerodia was reshuffled to become Minister of Education-an available pre-
caution for any government which finds its foreign minister unwelcome in
foreign capitals. This change in circumstances should have made it unnec-
essary for Belgium to cancel the warrant, but the Democratic Republic of
Congo insisted, in the dated language of ceremonial affront, that it had
suffered "moral injury" from the fact that one of its ministers had been
proceeded against in defiance of the immunity.
The court grounded the immunity, and inferred its scope, from the
nature and work of the ministry in question:
In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for
Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the
effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States.
In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must there-
fore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for
Foreign Affairs. He or she is in charge of his or her Government's diplomatic
activities and generally acts as its representative in international negotia-
tions and intergovernmental meetings ....
The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for
Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he
or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual
concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder
him or her in the performance of his or her duties ....
Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by travelling (sic] to or transiting
another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or
herself to legal proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling [sic]
internationally when required to do so for the purposes of the performance
of his or her official functions. 36
This approach may be criticized as somewhat anachronistic (foreign
ministers have no vital need to travel to states where they may be indicted;
they can send emails or ambassadors or hold a video conference) and as
ignoring the sensible state practice of reshuffling foreign ministers who
run into international legal difficulties. In many states, indeed, it is
regarded as a minister's duty to stand down and clear himself of a criminal
charge before resuming office. At least the ICJ's functional approach con-
fines the scope for immunity to the needs of representative government.
The court denied that its decision that national courts had no power
to proceed against serving foreign ministers meant impunity from prosecu-
tion for crimes against humanity or war crimes. Its key finding at para-
graph 61, summarized above, must be quoted in full:
36. DRC, supra note 30, i 53-55.
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Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incum-
bent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal
prosecution in certain circumstances.
First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in
their own countries and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in
accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law.
Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the
State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that
immunity.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign
Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by
international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under
international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign
Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to
his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that
period of office in a private capacity.
Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject
to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where
they have jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future International Criminal
Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter's Statute expressly
provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that "[ilmmunities or special procedu-
ral rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising
its jurisdiction over such a person."37
So far as it goes, the fourth proposition in paragraph 61 of DRC repre-
sents the rule of international law applicable to the assertion of an immu-
nity in an international criminal court. The ICJ clearly states that no such
immunity can bar prosecution in the ICTY, the ICTR or the ICC, and that
these are only examples of the "certain international criminal courts"
which may proceed against incumbent high officials "where they have
jurisdiction." 38 What is not certain, however, is the meaning of "certain"
in that crucial phrase. A sensible reading of paragraph 61 is that the "cer-
tain international criminal courts where they have jurisdiction" denotes
courts which are a) international and b) possess, by virtue of their statutes,
jurisdiction which expressly overrides immunity claims. The ICTY, ICTR
and ICC all have this feature in common-a commonality relevantly spelled
out by the ICJ's citation of Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute. This citation
must be the key to what is meant by the phrase "where they have jurisdic-
37. Id. l 61.
38. Id. The ICJ decision was delivered on February 14, 2002. Understandably, it
makes no mention of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which was established by an
agreement concluded only a few weeks before, and which had not been implemented at
that stage. The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has subse-
quently held that it falls within paragraph 61. See Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case no.
SCSL-03-01-I-059, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 42 (May 31, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf (outlining the status of
the court).
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tion" which in turn defines the "certain" courts, rather than the somewhat
throwaway reference to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter when describing
the origin (but not the jurisdiction) of the ICTY and ICTR. This interpreta-
tion permits the inclusion of the Nuremberg Tribunal amongst the "cer-
tain" courts, since its Charter contained an equivalent provision overriding
sovereign immunity and it was established before the U.N. itself came into
existence. 39 Nobody doubts that it had jurisdiction to override any claim
of immunity for Admiral Doenitz, Reich Marshal Goering and the other
Nazi leaders.
The interpretation is consistent with the context of the DRC Judgment:
the fourth proposition in paragraph 61 is foreshadowed by the court's
emphasis, in paragraph 47, on Congo's position that "the fact that an
immunity might bar prosecution before a specific court ... does not mean
that the same prosecution cannot be brought, if appropriate, before another
court which is not bound by that immunity .... It concludes that immu-
nity does not mean impunity."40
V. The Concurring Minority in D.R.C.
This interpretation of the ICJ's elliptically expressed fourth proposi-
tion in paragraph 61 of DRC does accord with principle and with dicta in
other cases such as Pinochet, as well as the approach in the opinion of the
ICJ concurring minority, who explain that immunity depends not only on
the status of the official but also upon "what type of jurisdiction, and on
what basis" the prosecuting authorities seek to assert it.4 1 "One of the
challenges of present day international law" they write "is to provide for
stability of international relations and effective international intercourse
while at the same time guaranteeing respect for human rights."'42 State
practice, as enshrined in treaties, evinces "a common endeavour in the face
of atrocities" by way of a duty to prosecute certain international crimes,
such as genocide, torture and grave violations of the Geneva Conventions,
which "open[ed] the door to a jurisdiction based on the heinous nature of
the crime rather than on links of territoriality or nationality."43 Hence "the
international consensus that the perpetrators of international crimes
should not go unpunished is being advanced by a flexible strategy, in
which newly-established international criminal tribunals, treaty obliga-
tions and national courts all have their part to play" in ending impunity for
crimes against humanity.44 Against this background, immunity is an
exception to the exercise of a jurisdiction to punish crimes against human-
39. The United Nations Conference on International Organization was attended by
fifty countries and the United Nations Charter was signed on June 25, 1945. The United
Nations came into existence on October 24, 1945.
40. DRC, supra note 30, 48.
41. DRC, supra note 30, 3.
42. Id. 1 5.
43. Id. 1 46.
44. Id. 51.
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ity. As an exception its value must always be balanced against the norma-
tive value of ending impunity:
[A] trend is discernable that in a world which increasingly rejects impunity
for the most repugnant offences, the attribution of responsibility and
accountability is becoming firmer, the possibility for the assertion of juris-
diction wider and the availability of immunity as a shield more limited. The
law of privileges and immunities, however, retains its importance since
immunities are granted to high State officials to guarantee the proper func-
tioning of the network of mutual inter-State relations, which is of paramount
importance for a well ordered and harmonious international system. 45
This approach is consistent with the fourth proposition in paragraph
61, namely that an international criminal court competently established
(whether by treaty or by the Security Council under Chapter VII) may exer-
cise its jurisdiction to override immunities if so directed by its statute; The
Special Court for Sierra Leone is so directed, for example, by Article 6(2)
of its Statute. 46
All immunities from criminal jurisdiction should be narrowly inter-
preted or "recognized with restraint '' 47 and in consequence a national
court exercising an international or extraterritorial jurisdiction (as in
extradition) should not recognize them in respect of an ex-head of state,
because there can be no realistic interference with government functions by
so doing. This was the result in the Pinochet proceedings, at least in
respect of extradition pursuant to the Torture Convention. The majority in
DRC, contemplating a situation when the high official has ceased to hold
office (proposition 3, paragraph 61), would permit his prosecution "in
respect of acts committed during that office in a private capacity. '48
VI. The Pinochet Precedent
If the Pinochet cases, Nos. I and III, established anything, it is the
unworkability in criminal law of the distinction between "public" (or "offi-
cial") acts and "private" acts-a distinction which the Court in U.S. v
Noriega presciently predicted "may prove elusive."'49 It is easy to accept
that Noriega's drug trafficking whilst head of the Panamanian government
could not constitute public acts done on behalf of the Panamanian State.
But compare the charges against Pinochet-his alleged direction of system-
atic torture by army, police and secret service of his political opponents,
and his agreement with other governments to eliminate "leftists" in the
region through "Operation Condor." In the view of the two judges in the
minority in Pinochet No. I, it was pellucidly clear that these were acts com-
mitted in an official, sovereign capacity which in consequence attracted
45. Id. 1 75.
46. See Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(2), Jan. 16, 2000, U.N.
Doc. 5/2002/246, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scs-statute.html.
47. DRC, supra note 30, 1 79.
48. DRC, supra note 30, 1 61.
49. 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1521-22 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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immunity from criminal process.50 The inevitability of this conclusion, as
a matter of commonsense, was avoided by the three majority judges on the
ground that immunity was a doctrine of international law and precluded
prosecution only:
in respect of acts performed in the exercise of functions which international
law recognises as functions of a head of state, irrespective of the terms of his
domestic constitution . . . [aInd it hardly needs saying that torture of his
own subjects, or of aliens, would not be regarded by international law as a
function of a head of state .... [I]nternational law has made plain that
certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage-taking, are not
acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of
state, or even more so, as it does to anyone else; the contrary conclusion
would make a mockery of international law.
5 1
Although the authority of Pinochet No. I may be questionable in
United Kingdom domestic law since one of the judges in the majority was
subsequently disqualified, this analysis appears correct as a matter of inter-
national criminal law at this juncture. The "retirement immunity" referred
to in the third proposition in paragraph 61 of DRC cannot protect against
charges of crimes against humanity because the commission of such
crimes is outside any official function. In this way, as the concurring ICJ
minority explains, the door is opening in municipal law to a jurisdiction
based on the heinous nature of the crime rather than on territorial or
nationality links.
The third proposition in DRC, which denies retirement immunity "in
respect to acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity"
should be read with the Pinochet No. I qualification that heads of govern-
ment who have, whilst in office, harnessed the sinews of the state for the
commission of crimes against humanity will be characterized or deemed in
international law as having acted in a private capacity.
Although the United States Supreme Court has said in Nelson (like the
minority in Pinochet No. I) that acts of torture by police, army and security
services are quintessentially "official" acts, this now requires further analy-
sis.5 2 They are acts by officials, certainly, but they are not legitimate
actions for officials to take. Because sovereign immunity is an interna-
tional law rule, the functions of the sovereign cannot sensibly include
behavior which is contrary to jus cogens, and which therefore every sover-
eign has an erga omnes obligation to the international community to
foreswear. Hitler was acting "officially" when ordering the Final Solution,
but his personal immunity could not subsequently have availed him
against prosecution for a crime against humanity. A head of state who kills
50. See R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [20001
1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter Pinochet I] (Lords Slynn and Lloyd, dissenting), avail-
able at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd981125/pino
01.htm.
51. Id. at 108-9 (Lord Nicholls) (emphasis added).
52. See generally Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (holding that the
United States did not have jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 because such acts were not commercial activities).
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his gardener in a fit of rage, or tortures for the pleasure of watching the
death agonies of his victims (Montaigne's somewhat dated definition of the
furthest point in cruelty) could always have been prosecuted after his over-
throw for these "private crimes," because they are outside his retirement
immunity, which is restricted to acts relating to his official functions. 53
Different approaches were taken in the individual opinions of the
seven judges who decided Pinochet No. III where the head of state immu-
nity issue was affected by interpretation both of United Kingdom national
immunity legislation and of the Torture Convention. There was, however,
consensus that customary international law now justifies states in appre-
hending and punishing "common enemies of mankind" who commit cer-
tain "high crimes" prohibited by a rule of international law with jus cogens
force. The proposition advanced by Sir Arthur Watts in 1994 was
endorsed:
[T]he idea that individuals who commit international crimes are internation-
ally accountable for them has now become an accepted part of international
law. Problems in this area-such as the non-existence of any standing inter-
national tribunal to have jurisdiction over such crimes, and the lack of agree-
ment as to what acts are internationally criminal for this purpose-have not
affected the general acceptance of the principle of individual responsibility
for international criminal conduct .... It can no longer be doubted that as a
matter of general customary international law a Head of State will person-
ally be liable to be called to account if there is sufficient evidence that he
authorized or perpetrated such serious international crimes.
54
This principle, as all judges in Pinochet Nos. I and III accepted, must
apply to cases "where the international community has established an
international tribunal in relation to which the regulating document
expressly makes the head of state subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction."5 5
The examples given (Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, ICTY and ICTR,
ICC) were of "cases in which a new court with no existing jurisdiction is
being established" and where the constitutive documents expressly provide
jurisdiction which overrides immunity. 56
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, established with Article 6(2) in its
statute, answers this description, although the Iraqi Special Tribunal does
not. The actual decision in Pinochet No. III concerned the immunity of an
ex-head of state in criminal proceedings brought in a national court and
the judges found in the Torture Convention a basis for universal jurisdic-
tion over that crime in the courts of nations which have ratified it Since
that Convention defined "torture" as an act committed by a public official,
it was strictly unnecessary to decide whether the guilty official had been
acting in a public or private capacity. Although two of the six-judge major-
53. See examples given by Lord Steyn in Pinochet No. 1, supra note 50.
54. Watts, supra note 26, at 82-84.
55. Pinochet No. III, supra note 21, at 204(E) (emphasis in the original).
56. Id. at 204. Also note that the dissenting judges in Pinochet No. I, (Lords Slynn
and Lloyd) regarded the immunity as ineffective against proceedings brought before an
international criminal tribunal.
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ity thought that torture ordered in the interests or for the benefit of the
State retained its characteristic as an official act,5 7 two others demurred:
"How can it be for international law purposes an official function to do
something which international law itself prohibits and criminalises?"58 A
fifth judge, Lord Phillips, pointed out that "[an international crime is as
offensive, if not more offensive, for the international community when
committed under colour of office. Once extra-territorial jurisdiction is
established, it makes no sense to exclude from it acts done in an official
capacity. 59
VII. The Present Rule
This historical excursus demonstrates that the provision in Article
6(2) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute, namely, "[tihe official
position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government
or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment, '60 is now so entrenched
in state practice and international jurisprudence that it reflects a rule
applicable before international courts. Although Sir Arthur Watts in his
1994 lectures regarded the rules about immunity as "in many respects still
unsettled,"6 1 they have now, a decade on, crystallized precisely in the form
stated in Article 6(2) in respect of the power of international courts to
exercise international jurisdiction over heads of state and other political
and military leaders.
This power is unvarnished and unrestricted in the sense that it has no
place for distinctions which have been made in the municipal laws gov-
erning immunities, e.g. distinctions between absolute immunity (ratione
personae) which exists for all acts committed during a head of state or
ambassador's tenure of office, and the more limited immunity (ratione
materiae) which applies to ex-heads and lesser officials, protecting them
from acts performed as part of their official functions but not for acts done
for private gratification. Such distinctions may be meaningful when the
immunity is asserted in national law: they can have no place in a system of
international criminal justice aimed at "the planners and designers, the
inciters and leaders." These are people of power or wealth or both and
their motivation for widespread and systematic abuse of power, whether
private greed or public aggrandizement, is irrelevant. Indeed the very fact
that the act was "official" state policy would make it more serious in inter-
national law, with its object of punishing those who wield state power for
criminal ends.
The State immunity of rulers or officials or ambassadors derives from
a seventeenth century when states were ruled by divine right or feudal
57. Lords Hope and Saville. See Pinochet No. III, supra note 21, at 242(C), 266(F).
58. Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Hutton. Id. at 204(G), 262(B).
59. Id. at 290.
60. Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra note 46.
61. Watts, supra note 26, at 52.
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inheritance, and lacked the facilities for instantaneous communication we
now take for granted. Traditional rationales -the indignity of putting a sov-
ereign on trial or the incapacity of judges to determine political questions,
carry less weight in the twenty-first century. Even the "functional"- ratio-
nale of immunity, based on the need of heads of state and foreign ministers
to travel abroad in order to do state business, is less crucial in the age of the
e-mail and the video conference. As modern developments call traditional
rationales into question, so the attitude towards international crimes has
changed. International law now acknowledges the imperative need to end
impunity for crimes against humanity, and the logical consequence of this
imperative is to end all immunity of state officials, past and present, who
are credibly arraigned on such charges by international courts.
Uncertainty still attends the power of national courts to entertain
prosecutions of heads of state under municipal law or through the pur-
ported exercise of universal jurisdiction: that these powers remain
restricted in criminal proceedings appears from the recent cases of DRC
and Pinochet, and their very existence in civil actions is doubtful: see Al-
Adsani v. U.K.62 and Tachiona v. Mugabe.63 But if a "hybrid" court is prop-
erly invested with international criminal jurisdiction, its prosecutor may
indict any present or past head of state whom the evidence credibly shows
to be guilty of the war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Pinochet is momentous because it was the first occasion on which a
municipal court refused to afford immunity to a former head of state, on
the ground that there could be no immunity against prosecution for certain
international crimes. But in an area of law which is developing with
extraordinary momentum, the opinions delivered in its course may appear,
five years on, to bear the over-caution which often attends the early devel-
opment of legal doctrine. The simple approach of Lord Phillips, for exam-
ple, now seems to "cut to the chase" more effectively than the somewhat
arid distinction between "private" and "public" acts, and more sensibly
than the somewhat academic argument that it can never be an official func-
tion in international law (however "official" it has beent in fact) to do some-
thing which international law prohibits. Torture, surely, is torture,
whether committed in the interests of state or (as in Montaigne's example)
for malicious pleasure. It may very much be in the interest of the state to
torture those who would overthrow it: Alan Dershowitz has even argued for
reversion to a Napoleonic "torture warrant" (as seen in Act II of Tosca)
whereby a judge might be persuaded to authorize the infliction of physical
pain as a means of extracting information from terrorists.64
The answer is that international law prohibits torture, whatever the
motive, and by the most imperative force at its command (albeit couched in
Latin terms-jus cogens, erga omnes, etc. -phrases incomprehensible to tor-
turers unless they are also international lawyers). If that message is to go
62. 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 (2001) (holding that state immunity was not a denial of
access to court).
63. 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
64. ALA M. DERSiOWTZ, WHY TERRORisM WoR.Ks (2002)
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forth into the world, it must bear the hallmarks of clarity (a necessary qual-
ity of criminal law) and workability (in the sense of accommodating to the
real world). And if international law really is to do its utmost to end impu-
nity, then the traditional obeisance to state immunity in civil actions
should be reconsidered as well.
As of 2005, the position of immunity in international criminal law is
as follows:
i. No immunity may be asserted in an international criminal court to bar
the indictment, arrest or trial of a serving head of state, head of govern-
ment, ambassador or foreign minister or other high official for war crimes
or crimes against humanity. Whether the indictee is a serving or former
high official is irrelevant. All that matters is that the court is a competent
international criminal court and is endowed expressly or by necessary
implication with a jurisdiction to override sovereign immunities.
ii. In national criminal courts and international criminal courts which lack
competence or the necessary jurisdiction, such immunity will bar any pros-
ecution if a) asserted by the state; b) in respect of a serving high official. If
the indicted official no longer holds high office, the immunity will bar
prosecution for all crimes committed during tenure of that office except a)
crimes against humanity as defined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute, geno-
cide as defined in the Genocide Convention, torture under the Torture
Convention and war crimes defined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention, and b) crimes under the national law of the forum committed
with the intention of personal gratification or enrichment.
iii. In national courts, immunity may be asserted under municipal law to
bar civil claims against incumbent or retired officials which are based on
the commission of criminal offences. In international civil courts or arbi-
tral tribunals applying international law, however, there is no reason in
principle why immunity claims should not be overridden when the claim
is based on commission of crimes against humanity.
VIII. Curial Competence
It is not enough for a court to have an immunity-busting clause like
Article 6(2) in its statute; there must be a satisfactory indication that this
competence to override state immunity "bears the imprimatur of... inter-
national consensus" 6 5 or at least requires (or has good claim on) the sup-
port of the international community. This quality is also necessary-
otherwise it would be possible to envisage a court established by treaty
between two allied states, in which they attempted by a provision akin to
Article 6(2) to clothe it with competence to put on trial the leader of a third
state. Another example would be to establish a national court onto which
some international elements had been grafted, such as the presence of one
international judge or the power to prosecute international crimes, like the
65. Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 280 n.78 (as creations of the U.N. Security Council,
the ICTY and ICTR bear this imprimatur).
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Iraqi Special Tribunal. 6 6 There must be a proper basis for the establish-
ment of an international court, which cannot be found merely in the fact
that it applies international law or has been set up as the result of an inter-
national treaty.
In the case of the ICC, that true international element is found in the
Rome Statute, which did not enter into force until ratified by sixty states,
and which provided for a court comprising eighteen elected international
judges. It was found in the Nuremberg tribunal, notwithstanding that its
charter was vouchsafed by only four states, because those states (to which
the German Reich had unconditionally surrendered) represented, at that
juncture in history, most of the free world. The Tokyo tribunal comprised
eleven international judges and was established by the occupying power
following surrender. The ICTY and ICTR were established by the Security
Council, and its decision must be taken to represent the collective judg-
ment of the international community.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone fell within this category because it
has been established by treaty to which the Security Council is party, it has
been expressly clothed with immunity-busting jurisdiction and it com-
prises a majority of international judges and an international prosecutor.
The U.N. Security Council initiated the establishment of the Sierra Leone
court to deal with breaches of international criminal law and in order to
cope with the situation that "continues to constitute a threat to interna-
tional peace and security in the region."'6 7 When, in Resolution 1315, the
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to "negotiate an agree-
ment with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent and
special court consistent with this Resolution" 68 it was acting on behalf of
all members of the United Nations.69 Resolution 1315 recommends that
the Special Court "should have personal jurisdiction over persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the crimes ... includ-
ing those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of an implementation of the peace process in Sierra
Leone." 70
IX. The Iraqi Special Tribunal
On this analysis, the Special Tribunal is not an international court or
an established Iraqi court. It was set up by appointees of the United States
interim administration, and paid for at the cost of $75 million, by the
66. And possibly the court set up by General Assembly Resolution 57/228A (18
Dec. 2002) to try Khmer Rouge leaders, which is avowedly established "in the existing
court structure" of Cambodia. U.N. GOAR, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 109 (b), at 1 U.N.
doc. A/RES/57/228 (2002).
67. S.C. Res. 1312, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1312 (2000) [hereinafter Resolution 1315].
68. Id. 1.
69. This is plain from Article 24(1) of the Charter, under which U.N. members
"agree that in carrying out its duties ... the Security Council acts on their behalf." U.N.
Charter art. 24, 11 1.
70. Resolution 1315, supra note 67, 3.
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United States in the wake of a war which a considerable body of expert
opinion considers to have been contrary to international law. It is not jus-
tifiable as a court-martial, because Saddam is not charged with war crimes
related to the allied invasion or occupation of his country. He is charged
both with crimes against international law such as genocide in respect of
Kurds and Marsh Arabs, and crimes-murders and so forth-that are
against local law.
Regrettably, the new democratically elected government has thus far
declined to make the tribunal legally water-tight both in respect of its juris-
diction over a former head of state and in respect of the independence and
impartiality of its judges. Both objectives could be secured through a treaty
between the government of Iraq and the United Nations similar to the
arrangements which have been made for the war crimes court in Sierra
Leone. This would have the great advantage of permitting international
judges, appointed by the U.N. and experienced in international law, to sit
alongside Iraqi colleagues. International law precedents clearly endorse
the legality of such a court provided it is independent of the local govern-
ment and has a statute that generally complies with human rights norms.
It would also overcome the objection to lack of impartiality of a court made
up of Iraqi judges who had been victims of Saddam. Article 4(d) of the
Tribunal Statute gives the government the authority to appoint non-Iraqi
judges "who have experience in the crimes encompassed in this Statute
and who shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity. '7 1
An international court, applying international law, would have
another massive advantage. It would be able to approach the sovereign
immunity issue which will be Saddam's first line of defence from an inter-
national law perspective without being bound by the amnesty clause in the
old Iraqi Constitution. That is because international law operates in a dif-
ferent dimension to local law and overrides pardons, amnesties and immu-
nities when the charge is genocide or the commission of crimes against
humanity. General Pinochet, when in power in Chile, consistently heaped
constitutional immunities upon himself and his henchmen: they were of no
avail against the "extradite or prosecute" provisions of the torture conven-
tion. The Sierra Leone Special Court has consistently held that pardons
and amnesties granted in the course of the war cannot bar prosecution
from international crimes.72 So establishing an international forum for the
trial of Saddam will not only avoid endless technical objections which
would otherwise have some substance, but would assist in persuading the
wider world-including the Arab world-that he was not being railroaded
by the United States.
Cynics-and there are many-have claimed that the United States gov-
ernment resists international input because it wants Saddam, once con-
71. Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14 AR 72(G), Appeals Chamber
(May 25, 2004).
72. Id.
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victed, hanged by the neck until he is dead. That is not a sentence available
to international courts, although it has been much used in Iraq, especially
by Saddam himself. It is not clear that this necessarily follows from an
Iraq-only trial: President Talibani, who will have the power to commute his
sentence, is a life-long opponent of the death penalty. Nothing could be
more calculated to make Saddam a martyr than a public execution. Of
course it would be dangerous to leave him in prison in Iraq and there is
obvious force in the objections by victims who do not want the grand
author of the their miseries to live out his life in comparative comfort
under the liberal prison regime in Finland with full visiting rights, tele-
phone access and a weekly ration of condoms.
There is a case for providing no more than the legal minimum of
humane treatment to those guilty of crimes against humanity, in far-flung
jails where they will never be heard from again. The British government
should make St. Helena available again for this purpose, or better still the
Falkland Islands, where if convicted, Slobo and Saddam might shiver away
their last years in the company of South Atlantic penguins. If they are
really to suffer for committing the worst crimes in the world, a harsh
regime of that kind for the rest of their lives is surely more appropriate than
giving them an easy and quick exit on the gallows.
Conclusion
That international criminal justice is here to stay was confirmed in
March 2005, when the United States withheld its veto and permitted the
Security Council to authorize the ICC to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. Amongst those
alleged to bear greatest responsibility are leaders of the Sudanese govern-
ment; if indicted, the developments outlined in this article will ensure that
they can claim no immunity. The Security Council decision on Darfur
came as a jolt to some states which had calculated that American antipathy
to the ICC would cripple it for the foreseeable future; now it is a force that
any government which mistreats its people must reckon with. The Rome
Statute requires a conference in 2009 to reconsider the future of the court.
It must be hoped that by that time the United States will have found inter-
national justice of sufficient benefit to become a party.
We have come far, then, and lately very fast, in the "great business"
began by Cromwell, Peters, Vane, Cooke and the Harvard "class of '42," in
denying impunity to tyrants. "Be you ever so high, the law is above you"
was their catch-cry, and it has only been entrenched, as a matter of binding
international law, over the past decade. So it is little wonder that the trial
of Milo~evit has had so many procedural hiccups, and that the trial of Sad-
dam seems likely to be flawed. We are at last and at least making a start on
the great business, and working toward a process that must eventually
become expeditious, fair and efficient (and cost-efficient). At present,
international criminal trials are disastrously slow. Lawyers can be medio-
cre and venal and the human rights of victims and witnesses are not as
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secure as those of defendants. I could go on, and these practicalities now
assume importance in taking the project forward. But the trials of
Milogevit and Saddam, for all their faults, demonstrate that the immunity
problem has been solved, and usher in a period when international justice
will have its own momentum.

